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The Supreme Court Limits the Fifth
Amendment Right to Counsel by Requiring
Clear Requests - Davis v. United States
INTRODUCTION
In Miranda v. Arizona,' the Supreme Court established that criminal
suspects have a right, under the Fifth Amendment, to have counsel
present during any custodial interrogation. However, Miranda and later
Supreme Court cases did not determine whether an ambiguous or
equivocal statement constitutes an invocation of this right. State and
lower federal courts developed three major approaches to the problem.
The first approach declared that any ambiguous reference to an attorney
invoked the right to counsel 2 Courts adopting the second approach held
that only clear requests for counsel would suffice.3 The third approach,
adopted by most federal circuits, required police faced with an ambiguous
or equivocal statement to ask strictly limited questions to clarify the
suspect's intention before proceeding firther.4
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978) ("[Q]uestioning must stop if the
defendant 'indicates in any manner and at any state of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking.' " (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445) (emphasis
in Maglio)); People v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 1390, 1394 (Cal. 1975) (relying on
Miranda for the phrase "in any manner and at any stage of the process" (emphasis in
Superior Court)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Ochoa v. State, 573 S.W.2d 796, 800
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (refusing to require a "'formal request' or absolute demand for
a lawyer").
3 People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Bl. 1980) ('We do not believe ... that
the Supreme Court intended by ['in any manner'] that every reference, no matter how
vague, indecisive or ambiguous, should constitute an invocation of the right to counsel.'),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981); Dean v. Commonwealth, 844 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Ky.
1992) (focusing onthe language of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), to state that
the accused must clearly assert his right to counsel), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2737 (1994);
Eaton v. Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 385, 396 (Va. 1990) (requiring a clear assertion of
the right to counsel), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991).
4 Poyner v. Murray, 964 F.2d 1404, 1411-12 (4th Cir.) (allowing police to resume
questioning when the suspect initiated the conversation), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 419
(1992); United States v. Eaton, 890 F.2d 511, 514 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that defendant
never even equivocally asserted his right to an attorney), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 906
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The Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of police conduct in
the face of ambiguous statements in Davis v. United States, and adopted
the second, "clear request," approach by a five to four decision.'
The five justices in the majority applied the narrowest reading of
Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona,7 holding that only absolutely clear
requests constitute an invocation of the right to counsel 8 Four concurring
justices advanced the position that when a reference to an attorney is
ambiguous, police should clarify the suspect's intentions before proceed-
ing?
The Davis decision, while probably serving the efficient administra-
tion of justice, is of doubtful assistance to the effective administration of
justice, and threatens to overrun the rights of accused citizens. The
concurring opinion of Justice Souter in Davis represents the best approach
to the problem, properly balancing the rights of the accused and the
interests of justice. o
Part I of this Note discusses the suspect's right to counsel as
established in Miranda and Edwards." Part II examines the three
approaches taken by lower courts to the problem of ambiguous state-
ments. 2 Part LI discusses Supreme Court development of the right to
(1990); United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that
continuation of questioning was proper because the defendant's statement could "[bly no
stretch .. be construed as a request for counsel ... ."); United States v. Fouche, 776
F.2d 1398, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that police may clarify any ambiguities);
United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124, 1131 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[No statement taken after
[an equivocal] request is made and before it is clarified as an effective waiver of the
present assistance of counsel can clear the Miranda bar." (quoting Thompson v.
Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1979)) (emphasis omitted) (alterations in
Cheny); Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 517-18 (5th Cir.) (allowing clarification questions
but warning that an officer may not 'Vtlize the guise of clarification as a subterfuge for
coercion or intimidation'), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979). For several examples of
what has constituted an ambiguous statement, see Rhonda Y. Cline, Equivocal Requests
for Counsel: A Balance of Competing Policy Considerations, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 767,
770-74 (1987).
114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
6 Id. at 2352. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the court. Id.
7451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (holding that, once invoked, the right to have counsel
present during interrogation may only be waived when the suspect "initiates futher
communication, exchanges, or conversations" with authorities). See infra notes 39-48 and
accompanying text.
" Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
9 Id. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
10 See id. at 2358-64 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
"See infra notes 17-52 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 53-117 and accompanying text.
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counsel after Edwards but before Davis.3 Part IV discusses the Davis
decision. 4 Part V evaluates the benefits and dangers of each theory. 5
This Note concludes that the "clarification!' approach represents the best
standard for handling ambiguous statements. 6
L THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The United States Supreme Court declared in Miranda v. Arizona that
all suspects have, and must be informed of, the right to have counsel
present during any custodial interrogation. 7 Fifteen years later, in
Edwards v. Arizona, the Court farther developed the right to counsel by
placing suspects who have invoked the right off-limits to further
questioning. 8
A "custodial interrogation" for purposes of Miranda is "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.' 19 Under Miranda, police must, prior to any custodial questioning,
inform a suspect of the right to have counsel present during question-
ing.2' However, this right may be "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelli-
gently" waived.2V ' If the suspect's Miranda rights are waived, police may
then question the suspect until the suspect invokes the right by requesting
an attorney. Questioning must then cease until an attorney is pres-
ent.' Any statements obtained from questioning after a suspect invokes
his Miranda right to counsel may not be used against the suspect in later
court proceedings.' Such statements are considered to have been
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.'
t See infra notes 118-35 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 136-63 and accompanying text.
is See infta notes 164-76 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 177-91 and accompanying text.
'v Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
18 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
19 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 I at 474.
"' Id.; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481 (1981).
24 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
2' Id. at 479. The Miranda line of cases focuses all but exclusively on the Fifth
Amendment. The Sixth Amendment is applicable only after formal proceedings have been
initiated, as in an arraigoment or indictment. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 480 n.7.
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The requirements imposed by Miranda were not held to be part of the
Fifth Amendment itself. Rather, they were deemed "procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." '6
A primary motivation behind Miranda was the Court's view that a
police interrogation is an inherently intimidating and coercive proce-
dure.' The Court noted that
the ease with which the questions put to [the suspect] may assume an
inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly,
to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a comer,
and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, ... made the system [of
justice] so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total aboli-
tion.2
The Court recounted numerous examples of abusive and coercive police
behavior in incommunicado interrogations." The majority believed that,
in this compelling setting, significant procedural safeguards were
necessary to preserve a criminal suspect's constitutional right against self-
incrimination.30 They cited several manuals and speeches on interroga-
tion tactics, all of which emphasized prolonged isolation and various
The Fifth Amendment reads as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, ... nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
The Sixth Amendment reads as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
' Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
27 Id. at 445.
Id. at 442-43 (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595-96 (1896)).
SId. at 446 n.6. The Court cited beating, hanging, whipping and protracted
interrogations as examples. Id.
30 Id. at 469.
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forms of trickery, such as persuading, cajoling, and deceiving the
suspect3' to produce a confession. 2 The materials dealt specifically
with how to encourage a suspect who has asked to consult with an
attorney to speak before the attorney's arrival.3
The Miranda Court praised the Constitution's drafters for including
the protections of the Fifth Amendment. These protections, when
guaranteed by the requisite procedural devices, the Court said, were
designed to remedy the problem of improperly obtained incriminating
statements:
So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves
upon the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one
accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part
of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a
mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the
impregnability of a constitutional enactment.'
Miranda was not solely concerned with fairness to criminal suspects.
Another basic aim of the decision was "to give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow" 35 so that
the judicial system could function consistently and effectively. Such was
the reason for the precise enumeration of the now-famous "Miranda
warnings."
36
31 The Court stated that "The manuals quoted in the text following are the most
recent and representative of the texts currently available." Id. at 447-56, 448 n.8.
Examples of suggested interrogation techniques included isolation of the suspect;
unfamiliar or uncomfortable surroundings to unnerve the suspect; perseverance to wear
the suspect down; offer of legal excuses to rationalize the suspect's confession as not
legally binding; the "Mutt and Jeff" routine where one "good cop" protects and defends
the suspect from another "bad cop," thereby gaining the suspect's trust for "good cop,"
who coerces him to confess; false line-ups to scare the suspect into thinking he has been
positively identified, and down-playing the assistance of counsel to gain a quicker
statement. Id. at 452.
" Id. at 449-51.
3 Id. at 454 n.22.
' Id. at 443 (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595-96 (1896)).
31 Id. at 441-42.
36 Id. at 471.
Standard police procedure now outlines the rights that must be read to a suspect upon
arrest as follows:
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS
1. You have the right to remain silent.
1995-96]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
Miranda held that questioning must cease when a suspect "indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking .... ," The phrase "in any manner,"
while suggesting a liberal interpretation of a suspect's statement did not
settle the question of what exactly constitutes an invocation of the right
to counsel. Many suspects fail to say anything so precise as "I decline to
answer any more questions until I have consulted with an attorney," "I
want an attorney now," or any other unequivocal statement. The Miranda
court believed that the inability of suspects to formulate clear statements
was yet another by-product of the custodial interrogation atmosphere.'
In Edwards v. Arizona,9 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
waiver of the right to counsel once it has been invoked. Police arrested
Edwards and informed him of his rights pursuant to Miranda," but he
agreed to submit to questioning without an attorney.4' Officers also
allowed Edwards to contact a county prosecutor in an attempt to negotiate
a deal 2 After deciding not to call the prosecutor, Edwards asked for an
attorney and the questioning ceased.43 The next day, however, detectives
came to interview Edwards in jail, without the presence of counsel, and
again advised him of his Miranda rights.' Edwards agreed to talk, and
eventually gave self-incriminating information, which was admitted into
evidence at his trial.4"
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in court.
3. You have the right to have an attorney before making any statement and
may have your attorney with you during questioning.
4. If you cannot afford an attorney and desire one, the court will appoint
one for you.
5. You may stop the questioning at any time by refusing to answer further
or by requesting to consult with your attorney.
WAIVER
In order to secure a waiver, the following questions should be asked and an
affirmative answer secured to each.
1. Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you?
2. With these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now?
Kentucky State Police uniform notation of defendant's rights (taken from a laminated card
distributed to all officers by the Kentucky State Police).
'7 Id. at 444-45 (emphasis added).
38 See id. at 469-71.
, 451 U.S. 477 (1980).
41 Id. at 478.
41 Id.
4 2 Id. at 479. Edwards started to make the call, but then hung up. Id.
' Id. Edwards said. "I want an attorney before making a deal." Id.44 Id.
41 Id. When detectives went to see Edwards, he initially told his guard "that he did
[Vol 84
DAVR v. UNITED STATES
The Court reversed Edwards' conviction, holding that once invoked,
the right to counsel can be waived only if "the accused himself initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."'
This standard allows suspects to talk if they so desire, but sharply curtails
the danger of police badgering suspects into consenting to the reopening
of interrogation."
The language of the Edwards holding, however, created further
uncertainty concerning the question of just what constitutes invocation of
the right in the first place. The Court held that "it is inconsistent with
Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterro-
gate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to
counsel."" ' Thus, Edwards does not address the issue of ambiguous
assertions of the Miranda right to counsel.
Likewise, additional Supreme Court examination failed to resolve the
treatment of ambiguous statements that might or might not be construed
as invocations of the right to counsel." The wide range of attorney-
related references made by suspects led to a number of standards among
the lower courts for evaluating ambiguous statements.0 Three major
standards for handling ambiguous statements developed independently in
state and lower federal courts"' until the Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Davis v. United States in June, 1994.2
IL AMBIGUOUS REQUESTS
The approaches developed by federal and state courts fell into three
general categories, as described in Smith v. Illinois.' The first, the "per
se bar" approach, asked whether the suspect's statement was in any way
susceptible to interpretation as a request for counsel.' If so, the right
not want to talk to anyone. The guard told him that 'he had' to talk." Id.
4 Id. at 485.47 Id.
4
, Id. (emphasis added).
41 See infra notes 118-35 and accompanying text.
See infta notes 53-117 and accompanying text.
s' See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
2 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
' 469 U.S. 91 (1984) (per curiam). The Court in Snith determined that the suspect's
statement was unquestionably a request for counsel and thus, avoided choosing a standard
for ambiguous statements. The suspect was asked if he understood that he could have an
attorney present, and he responded. "Uh, yeah. I'dlike to do that." eo officers continued
questioning the suspect despite this statement. Id. at 93, 96.
m Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978); Ada Clapp, The Second Circuit
1995-961
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 84
was deemed to have been invoked, and all further questioning was
prohibited." The second group of courts developed a "threshold of
clarity" approach.56 These courts held that the right to counsel was
invoked only by a clear request for anattorney.57 Under this approach,
police could effectively ignore any ambiguous remarks,58 and continue
questioning. The third approach, the "clarification" standard, like the per
se bar approach, asked if the statement would suggest to police officers
that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel. 9 However, it
offered a somewhat more flexible response. Instead of breaking off all
questioning, police could ask specific, non-evidentiary questions tailored
to determine whether the suspect was indeed requesting counsel. Each
approach is examined in more detail in the discussion that follows.'
A. Per Se Bar
The courts adopting the per se bar approach took the "in any
manner" language of Miranda" literally, holding that any reference to
Review - 1988-1989 Term: Criminal Procedure: The Second Circuit Adopts a
Clarification Approach to Ambiguous Requests for Counsel: United States v. Gotay, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 511 (1990) (concluding that "the per se bar approach better serves
Miranda's goal of protecting an accused's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion during custodial interrogation!); see infra notes 61-83 and accompanying text.
"s Maglio, 580 F.2d at 205; People v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 1390, 1394 (Cal.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Ochoa v. State, 573 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978).
56 This approach is derived from interpreting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981).
' People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (M. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019
(1981); Dean v. Commonwealth, 844 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Ky. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 2737 (1994); Eaton v. Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 385, 395-96 (Va. 1990), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991). See infra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
3' See Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994).
'9 Poyner v. Murray, 964 F.2d 1404, 1411 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 419
(1992); United States v. Eaton, 890 F.2d 511, 513 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
906 (1990); United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v.
Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124,
1131 (5th Cir. 1984); Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 517 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
981 (1979). See infra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
See also Fouche, 776 F.2d at 1404-05 (examining the per se bar approach in
Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978) and the clarification standard of United
States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1984)).
61 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966) (holding that Fifth Amendment
rights are invoked when the suspect "indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult an attorney before speaking ").
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an attorney sufficed to invoke the suspect's right to counsel.' In Maglio
v. Jago,63 the defendant Maglio was arrested on suspicion of murder. A
police officer read Maglio the Miranda warnings, then asked: "Having
these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now without an attor-
ney[?]"" Magio answered, "Maybe I should have an attorney."'6-
Maglio was then told that the police were unable to provide him with
appointed counsel at the time, but that Maglio still had the right to refuse
to answer questions until a lawyer was available." Maglio then agreed
to talk without an attorney, and confessed.' He later repeated his
confession to a prosecutor under similar circumstances.' These confes-
sions were used to convict Maglio.69
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed Maglio's
conviction, declaring that "t]hle burden is on the State to establish waiver
in every case in which it seeks to introduce a statement taken without the
presence of counsel."' As to the standard for evaluating Maglio's
statement, 'Maybe I should have an attorney,"7' the court relied on
language from Miranda in determining that officers must cease question-
ing when the suspect "indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking."'
The court, endorsing a per se rule, noted that the interrogating officer had
recognized Maglio's facially equivocal statement as probably a request for
counsel,73 and held the confession invalid as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment.
In Ochoa v. State,' defendant Ochoa was arrested for murdering a
police officer. 5 He was given the Miranda warnings four separate times:
by the Sheriff, by a Justice of the Peace, by the county attorney, and
" See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
'3 580 F.2d 202 (6h Cir. 1978).
6' Id. at 203 n.l.
6' Id. at 203.
66Id.
6Id.
' Maglio appeared to be confid during the police interrogation about his right to
wait until an appointed lawyer was available before answering questions. Id.
9Id. at 204.
70 Id. at 205.
7' Id. at 203.
' Id. at 205 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966) (emphasis in
Magfio)).
3 Id. at 205.
74 573 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
71 Id. at 798.
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again by the Sheriff.76 After the fourth reading, defendant Ochoa made
an equivocal statement regarding counsel, but proceeded to talk with the
Sheriff." Ochoa eventually signed a written statement, which was used
by the prosecution in his trial.'
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, like the Sixth Circuit, stressed
a literal reading of Miranda in adopting the per se approach to equivocal
or ambiguous requests for counsel.79 The court quoted the same "in any
manner" passage from Miranda,"0 noting that "[t]he [Miranda] Court
emphasized that once a defendant indicate[s] in any way that he want[s]
an attorney interrogation must cease altogether."'" The court concluded,
in reversing Ochoa's conviction: "We read this language in Miranda
literally, where a defendant indicates in any way that he desires to invoke
his right to counsel, interrogation must cease."' Thus the court rejected
a requirement of a "formal request.""3
B. Threshold of Clarity
Before Davis, this narrowest of standards was adopted in only a few
states." In contrast to the courts adopting a literal interpretation of
Miranda's "in any manner"' 5 language, the Kentucky Supreme Court in
1992 used a literal reading of Edwards6 to impose the requirement that
requests for counsel be "unambiguous and unequivocal" ' In Dean v.
76 Id. at 799.
' Id. The exact content of Ochoa's equivocal statement is uncertain. The Sheriff
testified that it was "some mention as to he might possibly want to talk to an attorney."
Id.
72 Id. at 800.
79 Id.
"I d. ("If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that
he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no quesioning."
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966)) (emphasis in Ochoa)).
81Id.
'Id.
83 Id.
See supra note 57.
8' Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). See supra notes 61, 50.
86 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
'7 Dean v. Commonwealth, 844 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Ky. 1992) (citing Eaton v.
Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 385, 395-96 (Va. 1990)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2737
(1994). The court stated. "In our opinion, this standard most closely and correctly
interprets the direction in Edwards that custodial interrogation must cease when an
accused who has received Miranda warnings and has begun responding to questions 'has
clearly asserted his right to counsel."' Id. at 420 (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485)
[Vol 84
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Commonwealth, defendant Dean was arrested and promptly given the
Miranda warnings." He signed, and stated that he understood, a form
waiving his rights after police read the rights to him.89 During the
ensuing questioning, defendant asked the following question: "Should,
should I, should I have somebody here? I don't know.""0 The interview-
ing officer responded, "Well, that's up to you, but you told us, you know,
you're telling us your story. Now that's up to you."'" Dean agreed to
continue, and made no objections nor any further statements that might
be construed as requests for assistance of counsel
Dean argued that his statement constituted an invocation of the right
to counsel.93 The court disagreed, relying heavily on Edwards to
conclude that questioning must cease only when the suspect "has clearly
asserted his right to counsel"'
The Illinois Supreme Court chose a similar path in People v.
Krueger.95 Defendant Krueger was arrested for murder. The usual
routine of Miranda warnings, confirmation that the defendant understood,
and the signing of a waiver-of-rights form was followed.96 Police
officers then proceeded to question Krueger, first about some unrelated
burglaries, and Krueger responded. The officers then moved on to the
subject of the murder.9 At this point, Krueger made the ambiguous
statement which formed the basis for his appeal." Shortly thereafter,
Krueger gave an inculpatory written statement, admitting to stabbing the
victim.99
(emphasis in Dean).
"Id. at 418.
9Id.
90 Id. at 419.
91 Id.
9 Id.
9Id.
94 Id. at 420 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981)).
412 N.E.2d 537 (I1. 1980). The Illinois Supreme Court decided Krueger
in October, 1980, shortly before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Edwards in May,
1981.
Id. at 538.
9Id.
"The three detectives present each described Krueger's reaction in slightly different
terms. First: "Wait a minute. Maybe I ought to have an attorney. You guys are trying to
pin a murder rap on me, give me 20 to 40 years." Second: "Hey, you're trying to pin a
murder on me. Maybe I need a lawyer." Third: "Just a minute. That's a 20 to 40 years
sentence. Maybe I ought to talk to an attorney. You're trying to pin a murder rap on me."
Id.
-9 Id. at 539.
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The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Krueger's conviction."° It paid
more deference to the "in any manner" language of Miranda' than did the
Supreme Court of Kentucky in Dean." Nonetheless, it held that Krueger's
ambiguous statement categorically did not constitute an invocation ofthe right
to counsel." The Krueger Court stated: "We do not believe, however, that
the Supreme Court intended by this language that every reference to an
attorney, no matter how vague, indecisive or ambiguous, should constitute an
invocation of the right to counsel!"'
C. Clarification
Adopted by most federal courts, the clarification approach allowed the
police limited leeway when faced with an ambiguous statement."5 It was
also seen as the best means of preserving a suspect's rights: both the right
against self-incrimination and the right to speak freely."'
In United States v. Gotay,u°e law enforcement officers arrested defen-
dant Gotay in her apartment on several federal drug felonies and read her the
Miranda warnings!0 At the time of her arrest, during questioning at Drug
Enforcement Administration ("DEA") headquarters, and during questioning
by a prosecutor the next day, Gotay made several statements referring in
various manners to counsel or to her desire to talk... 9 Gotay did not have
' Id. at 541.
101 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). See supra notes 61, 80.
" Dean v. Commonwealth, 844 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Ky. 1992). The Supreme Court of
Illinois stated. "Miranda's 'in any manner' language directs that an assertion of the right
to counsel need not be explicit, unequivocal, or made with unmistakable clarity." Krueger,
412 N.E.2d at 540.
3 Krueger, 412 N.E.2d at 540.
104 Id.
'0' See supra note 59.
'06 See Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 517 (5th Cir.) (holding that statements to a
district attorney, made only with assurance that such statements would not waive
invocation of right to counsel at later stages, were not gained in violation of defendant's
rights), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
'07 844 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1988).
106 Id. at 972-73.
'09 Upon arresting her, a DEA agent asked "Are you willing to help us? ... If you
can help us, we can try and help you. Are you willing to talk with us or do you want the
lawyer[?]" Gotay replied, "No, no, I am very afraid. I don't want to talk in front of these
people." At DEA headquarters, Gotay told the agent present that "she couldn't afford a
lawyer, that she was concerned about obtaining a lawyer." The agent informed her that
the court would appoint one, then proceeded with substantive questioning. During
questioning by the prosecutor, Gotay stated that she needed appointed counsel. Id. at 973.
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the assistance of counsel until her bail hearing.' 0 She was convicted on
five counts."'
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed two counts of
Gotay's conviction.". The Court decided that Gotay's first statement
was not even an ambiguous request for counsel1 3 The statements in
the second and third settings, however, constituted "at least" ambiguous
requests."4 The court then held that, upon hearing those ambiguous
statements, officers were under a duty immediately to stop interrogation
"except for narrow questions designed to clarify the earlier statements and
the suspect's desire for counsel.""..5
The Second Circuit, in rejecting the threshold of clarity rule, felt that
"the Constitution, Miranda, and the cases construing it require that we
take care that suspects be allowed to invoke their rights freely. Suspects
should not be forced, on pain of losing a constitutional right, to select
their words with lawyer-like precision."'"6  The court also expressed
sentiment that the clarification standard would provide the best guidance
for law enforcement authorities. "Allowing custodial authorities to clarify
ambiguous requests will help them, as well as reviewing courts, to
determine on which side of the bright line the request falls.""
' 7
I THE SUPREME COURT FROM ED wARDS TO DAvis
Throughout the lower courts' development of the three aforemen-
tioned approaches to ambiguous requests,"8 the Supreme Court de-
clined to resolve the problem, offering only relatively minor refinements
II0 Id.
"' Id. at 972.
112 Id. at 978.
" The Court was convinced that the statement expressed fear of talking in front of
her accomplices, not any concern about police or lawyers. Id. at 975.
114 The court stressed Gotay's apparent, and understandable, confusion of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. "'When an accused requests an attorney ... he does
not know which constitutional right he is invoking; he therefore should not be expected
to articulate exactly why or for what purposes he is seeking counsel ... The simple fact
that defendant has requested an attorney indicates he does not believe that he is
sufficiently capable of dealing with his adversaries singlehandedly.' "Id. at 976 (quoting
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632-33, 633-34 n.7 (1986) (quoting People v. Bladel,
365 N.W.2d 56, 67 (Mich. 1984))).
... Id. at 975.
116 id.
117 Id.
.. See supra notes 61-117 and accompanying text.
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to the rules laid down in Miranda and Edwards.' In Smith v. illi-
nois 20 the Court expressly took notice of the disagreement among
lower courts, but chose not to resolve it.'
Police arrested defendant Smith, took him to an interrogation room,
and read him his Miranda rights. Police specifically asked Smith if he
understood his right to have counsel present during questioning.'m
Smith responded, "Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that."'" The officers contin-
ued interrogating Smith, ultimately eliciting incriminating information,
which was used to convict him.24
The Supreme Court reversed Smith's conviction.' The Court
declared Smith's statement to be a clear request for counsel, and added
an element to the Miranda-Edwards doctrine: "Where nothing about the
request for counsel or the circumstances leading up to the request would
render it ambiguous, all questioning must cease.... [A]n accused's
postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast
retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself. 126 This
was due, in part, to a concern that the police, through badgering or
overreaching, might (intentionally or not) coerce the suspect into
forfeiting a previously clear request for counsel.22 By deciding that
Smith had made a clear request for counsel, the Court avoided deciding
the ambiguous request issue. It did, however, take notice of the division
of opinion concerning the issue.'
In Connecticut v. Barrett' defendant Barrett, after being arrested
and properly Mirandized, said that he was willing to talk but would not
sign any written statement without the presence of counsel.". Question-
ing commenced, with one of the officers writing down what Barrett
said.' Barrett was convicted, based largely on the statements he made.
1 See supra notes 17-52 and accompanying text.
120 469 U.S. 91 (1984) (per cmuiam).
12 Id. at 95-96.
m Id. at 92-93.
I d. at 93.
124 Later in the interrogation, Smith made statements indicating that he was not
requesting counsel. Id.
123 Id. at 92.
1- Id. at 98, 100.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 95-96.
120 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
130 Id. at 525.
"The writing was not signed by Barrett. It was a transcript prepared by the officer
because the officer did not have access to a functioning recorder. Id. at 526.
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Barretts conviction, overturned by the Supreme Court of Connecticut,
was reinstated by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that suspects may
partially invoke the right to have counsel present during questioning by
agreeing to give oral but not written statements without counsel.1" A
suspect might also limit questioning to certain subject areas.' The Court
noted that the objective of Miranda was "to assure that the individual's right
to choose between speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the
interrogation process."'"M In holding that Barrett's statement constituted a
clear but limited request for counsel rather than an unclear, blanket request
for counsel, the Court once again avoided the issue of what to do with
ambiguous requests.
135
IV. DAVIS V. UNITED STATES
136
The clarification approach appeared to be well on its way to becoming
the national standard for the ambiguous or equivocal request issue. All of the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals that had addressed the issue, except
the Sixth Circuit, adopted the clarification approach in some form. 7 The
clarification approach had also become standard practice for most law
enforcement authorities, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation.'"
However, the United States Supreme Court adopted the threshold of
clarity approach in Davis v. United States,39 by a 5 to 4 vote.40 The four
concurring Justices agreed with the Court's result because the investigators
had in flct stopped and asked the defendant clarifying questions. They
rejected the majority's position that the suspect's statement, 'Maybe I should
talk to a lawyer," was conclusively not an invocation of the right to
counseL
141
"n The Court noted that the precise nature of Barrett's request suggested a
considerable comprehension of his rights. Id. at 530.
" For example, the suspect might be willing to talk about a theft, but not a murder.
Id. at 529-30.
m Id. at 528 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966)).
' Id. at 529-30 n.3.
n' 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
' See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit adopted the per
se bar approach. See Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978); supra notes 61-
73 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit does not appear to have addressed the issue.
n8 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring injudgment); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 485 (1966).
Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2350.
140 Id. at 2355.
'1 Id. at 2359 (Souter, J., concuring in judgment).
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In Davis, the defendant, a Navy seaman, was questioned by Naval
Investigative Service ("NIS") officers in connection with a murder.42
He was advised of his Miranda rights, 43 and agreed to submit to ques-
tioning. After some time, Davis said: "Maybe I should talk to a law-
yer."'1" Officers immediately broke off substantive questioning, ex-
plained their intentions, and asked Davis whether he was asking for a
lawyer, to which Davis replied "No.' 45 The officers paused momentari-
ly, reminded Davis of his rights, then resumed questioning. After about
an hour, Davis said, "I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else."
The officers immediately ended the interview.
46
In a trial by court-martial, Davis was convicted of murder, in part on
the basis of statements made during the second segment of the NIS
interview. His conviction was affirmed by both the Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Military Review and the United States Court of Military
Appeals. The court-martial and the Court of Military Appeals both
applied the "clarification" standard, determining that the officers had
appropriately sought to clarify Davis' wishes before continuing.
47
The conviction was then affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court. All of the Justices agreed that Davis' conviction should be
affirmed, but divided sharply as to the proper standard to apply to Davis'
statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer."' 4
A. Majority Opinion: O'Connor, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., and
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.
The majority's primary concern in hearing the case was to set a
uniform standard for what had become a troublesome legal and factual
question in several cases. 4 The majority, like the Kentucky and
142 Id. at 2353.
'1 Miranda is applied to the military by Presidential order and decisions of the Court
of Military Appeals. Id. at 2354 n.*.
44 Id. at 2353.
145 An officer described the exchange as follows: "We made it very clear that we're
[sic] not here to violate his rights, that if he wants [sic] a lawyer, then we will [sic] stop
any kind of questioning with him, that we weren't going to pursue the matter unless we
have [sic] it clarified is he asking for a lawyer or is he just making a comment about a
lawyer, and he said, 'No, I'mnot asking for a lawyer,' and then he continued on, and said,
'No, I don't want a lawyer."' Id.
146 Id.
'47 Id. at 2353-54.
1- Id. at 2357-59 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
'49 Id. at 2355.
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Virginia Supreme Courts,15 relied heavily on the language of Edwards
v. Arizona.5' They noted that the right to counsel created by Miranda
was not itself a constitutional right, but a procedural safeguard designed
to help secure the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination."
The majority concluded that, since the right to have counsel present
during custodial interrogation is not an inherent constitutional right, the
danger of denying counsel to some suspects who do want counsel but,
"because of fear ... [or] lack of linguistic skills," fail to formulate their
requests properly, is an acceptable danger.'
The majority opinion viewed the two more lenient approaches to
ambiguous requests as unnecessarily burdensome on police. "When the
officers conducting the questioning reasonably do not know whether or
not the suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring the immediate cessation
of questioning 'would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly
irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity.31154 The
Court saw the initial requirements of information and waiver as sufficient
protection for suspect's rights.'55
The majority also believed that the threshold of clarity standard was
superior in ease of administration. They felt that the threshold of clarity
standard's "bright-line" approach provided the best guidance to law
enforcement officers, avoiding risky and burdensome judgment calls. 56
B. Concurring Opinion: Souter, J., with Blackmun, Stevens, and
Ginsburg, JJ.
The four concurring justices endorsed the clarification approach
predominant among the federal circuits.'57 They viewed the clarification
"'. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
.. It is "impermissible for authorities 'to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he
has dearly asserted his right to counseL"' Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Edwards
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981)) (emphasis in Davis).
"Id. at 2354; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-73 (1966). See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
3 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356.
1 Id. at 2355-56 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)).
" "'Full comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is]
sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process."' Id. at
2356 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)) (alterations in Davis).
" Id. at 2355 ("'[A] statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or
it is not."' (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1984) (per curiam))).
17 Id. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). See supra notes 137-38 and
accompanying text.
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approach as the rule that best advances and balances "concerns of fairness
and practicality" present since Miranda.' They noted amicus briefs
submitted by, among others, the National District Attorneys Association,
the National Sheriffs' Association, and the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, Inc., all endorsing the clarification approach adopted by
the Court of Military Appeals.
5 9
The concurring Justices viewed the clarification approach as the best
way to advance two important concerns. First, it would "'assure that the
individual's right to choose between speech and silence remains
unfettered throughout the interrogation process.""' Second, they said
that Miranda should be able "to operate in the real world," where not
everyone speaks "with the discrimination of an Oxford don."' 6'
The concurring Justices felt that the clarification approach would
assure that suspects' wishes were most accurately respected." They
also interpreted the "clearly asserts" phrase in Edwards differently than
the majority, explaining it as an instruction for what to do when a request
is clear, not what to do only when a request is not clear."
V. IMPLICATIONS OF EACH THEORY
A. Per Se Bar
The per se rule no doubt affords suspects the greatest amount of
protection, whether they want it or not. Under this rule, police have no
opportunity to persuade the suspect out of a possible request for
counsel.'" Additionally, an ambiguous reference does not prevent
communication with the suspect. It only requires the additional presence
of the suspect's lawyer.65
1 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
"s Id. at 2356 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
'o Id. at 2360 (Souter, J., concuning in judgment) (quoting Connecticut v. Barrett,
479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987)) (emphasis in Barrett).
16 Id. at 2360, 2364 (Souter, L, concurring in judgment).
162 Id. at 2364 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
1 Id. at 2359-60 n.3 (Souter, J., concuning in judgment).
' See id. at 2363-64 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
165 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 110 n.2 (1975) (White, J., concurring inresult)
(agreeing that there was no breach of Miranda principles where the defendant was given
Miranda warnings, stated that he did not want to discuss the robberies, and later was
again given Miranda warnings but, during the second interrogation, offered a statement
without counsel); Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that
Miranda principles were violated where, after defendant stated that he wanted counsel,
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The per se rule is also favored due to its perceived fairness across
social lines. "A per se bar approach would ensure equal protection against
self-incrimination to poor, uneducated defendants by treating their inartful
requests for counsel as valid invocations."'66 Edwards does allow, even
under the per se approach, communication without the presence of an
attorney to resume, but only at the suspect's initiative." r But the
ordinary suspect is, more than likely, completely unaware of this
difference. The logical reaction of a suspect who has made a vague
reference to an attorney (perhaps without even knowing it), and has seen
the police immediately take their leave, is a belief that the police are
finished with their questioning. In such a case, there is little chance that
the suspect will know that only he may initiate any further conversation.
Consequently, there will likely be no further conversation until the
suspect is represented by counsel - whether the suspect wants it that way
or not.
The per se bar approach has been criticized as punishing innocent
police conduct and thwarting the effective administration of justice.
This broadest of approaches also threatens the rights of suspects, because
a necessary counterpart to the right to counsel is the ability to waive that
right. Such an open interpretation of ambiguous references as advocated
by Maglio can effectively prohibit an individual who sincerely wishes to
talk from being able to do so.69
B. Threshold of Clarity
The threshold of clarity approach was not widely advocated before
Davis. In Davis, the Court did not want police officers to have to guess
whether a suspect was invoking the right to counsel 7 Thus, the Court
adopted a very rigid rule, placing the line very far to the side of favoring
police.171
police told defendant that if he could not afford a lawyer he would have to wait until the
next day to have one appointed, after which the police continued the interrogation and
defendant confessed).
16 Clapp, supra note 54, at 541.
"1 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
'' See United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that an
ambiguous request for counsel precludes further interrogation except for questions
designed to clarify the ambiguity).
1 Id.; Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2364 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring
in judgment).
'~o See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355-56; supra text accompanying note 154.
" See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355-56; supra text accompanying note 154.
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Foremost among the concerns which produced Miranda was the
Court's belief that a custodial interrogation is an inherently coercive
proceeding. The Davis rule does much to undo Miranda. It all but
ignores Miranda's concern with coercion which might occur as a result
of the interrogation setting and, instead, relies on the danger of coer-
cion being cured in advance by the Miranda warnings and waiver."
Understandably, many suspects, while understanding the basic nature of
their rights and the language of the waiver form they sign, will not
understand what they are getting into by agreeing to questioning without
counsel.
Davis threatens to trample many legitimate attempts to obtain the
assistance of counsel. A mere colloquialism could invalidate a request. A
suspect can use the word "maybe" out of sarcasm, intimidation, or
incomplete English fluency. To hold this vague term out as constituting
an "ambiguous" statement is a questionable application and possible
abuse of this standard.
C. Clarification
Before Davis, most federal circuits had adopted the clarification
approach as the appropriate balance between the accused's right to
counsel and the interest of society in the effective administration of
justice.74 Under this approach, police are not penalized if they fail to
recognize some vague reference to a lawyer. On the other hand, suspects
are protected from police abuse of the custodial setting by the restriction
to narrow clarifying questions. The clarification approach best ensures
that suspects' wishes, whether opting for or against counsel, are
respected.
However, the clarification standard may present a danger because
there is potential for abuse by police officers. It is feared that officers
might take advantage of the opportunity to ask purported clarification
questions to badger the suspect into saying that he was not really asking
for counsel. 5
Finally, the clarification standard improves the reliability of state-
ments which will be used at trial. Defendants will be less able to argue
"2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).
' See supra note 155.
"7' See supra notes 4, 59, 105-17 and accompanying text.
'7' See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); Clapp, supra
note 54, at 537-39.
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at trial that they were badgered or confused by questioning officers, if the
police can show that they took extra care to clarify a suspect's intentions
regarding his rights during questioning.11
6
CONCLUSION
In a 1976 speech, Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell described
what he saw as "a 'sounder balance'... developing between the rights of
accused persons and the rights of a civilized society to have a criminal
justice system that is effective as well as fair."'77 The Davis decision
shifts this balance by sharply curtailing the rights of suspects defined in
Miranda and Edwards.
The Davis Court was motivated in part by a desire to simplify what
had been a difficult standard to apply.178 The courts applying the
clarification standard had been faced with the sensitive factual issues of
what statements of suspects were susceptible to interpretation as possible
requests for counsel and what constituted appropriate clarifying questions
by police.179 The former problem has not been solved, merely relocated
along a continuum. Now, the sensitive factual determination is whether
a particular statement is susceptible to interpretation only as a request for
counsel "'
The Davis decision has removed a level of responsibility from the
police. They no longer have a duty to clarify ambiguous remarks or
questions.1"' Judgment calls will no longer be made at the scene, with
the benefit of observing both the environment and the suspect's demeanor
at the time of the interrogation. They will not be made by police officers,
those perhaps most familiar with suspects in custody. Now, the courts,
removed from the actual events in both distance and time, must decide
whether a given statement is a clear request or not. The problem has not
1- See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); Clapp, supra
note 54, at 537-39.
' Lesley Oelsner, Powell Finds High Court Showing Sounder Balance, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 12, 1976 (Late City Edition), at 18, quoted in Charles R. Shreffler, Jr., Judicial
Approaches to the Ambiguous Request for Counsel Since Miranda v. Arizona, 62 NoTRE
DAM L. REv. 460, 462 (1987).
1 Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994).
' See, e.g., United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1985)
(remanding the case to the trial court to determine whether investigating FBI agents
properly clarified the defendant's ambiguous statement).
180 See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356-57.
... See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
1995-96]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
been eliminated. Rather, the gray area has been relocated. Courts are now
faced with the question of "how clear is 'clear'?"'"
It seems a simple task to determine a uniform standard for clarifying
an ambiguous statement, just as the Miranda warnings have become
standardized. A substantial majority of American television viewers could
probably give a satisfactory recitation of the Miranda warnings. The
clarification question would probably be even easier for suspects to
understand than the initial Miranda warnings. For example, "Are you
requesting the assistance of an attorney at this time?" should suffice, and
police departments would have little trouble including it in their standard
arrest and interrogation procedures.
Unlike the per se bar standard, the clarification approach does not
threaten to disrupt the administration ofjustice in any meaningful manner.
It imposes only a brief interruption to resolve and fulfill the actual
intentions of the suspect. At worst it amounts to reminding the suspect of
his rights. This might be viewed as a strategic disadvantage to police, but
in that respect so is the existence of the Miranda warnings."
The rules at the extremes, the per se rule and the threshold of clarity
rule, attempt to locate a decisive line. On one side of this line, the
suspect's statement has no impact on required police procedure." On
the other side of the line, the suspect's statement requires a total cessation
of questioning.'85 Given the boundless combination of words that might
come from a suspect's mouth, along with the rule that subsequent
utterances may not be used to explain the statement in question,1
86
either rule requires police to guess at the suspect's intention, with grave
consequences. Undoubtedly, numerous situations would arise with the
adoption in Davis of the threshold of clarity rule, where the losing party
cries foul at the hands of a "technicality."
In contrast, the clarification standard provides for a broader area
around the otherwise sharp line. It furnishes a manner of safety net,
where a simple procedure, a clarification question, easily standardized as
the Miranda warnings have been, can operate to avoid the potentially
disastrous consequences of either of the sharp line approaches.
1- Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 n.7 (Souter, J., concuning in judgment).
183 See id. at 23 62-63 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
'" See supra notes 3, 57 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 2, 55 and accompanying text.
186 See, e.g., United States v. Cheely, 21 F.3d 914, 922 (citing Smith v. Endele, 860
F.2d 1528, 1531-32 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990)), amended and
superseded, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) (amending in light of Davis v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994)).
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That the police are not to be put on notice by statements like "Maybe
I should talk to a lawyer" is an open invitation to abuse. Whereas the per
se bar rule,'" which took "in any manner"'' 8 literally, failed properly
to value an effective and efficient justice system, the threshold of clarity
rule fails properly to respect the rights of the accused.
Even among the lower courts adopting the threshold of clarity
approach, the standard did not appear to be defined as harshly as in
Davis. Note the deference paid in Krueger to Miranda's "in any
manner.'9 Though the Illinois court made no mention of the clarifica-
tion approach, additional language in Krueger suggests that the court
might have supported the more lenient standard. 9'
The Davis decision demonstrates a shift in the Supreme Court's
composition. Miranda revealed an overriding concern with protecting
individuals against the "system." Davis demonstrates a stronger concern
for the rights of society, in particular the right to be protected from
criminals by an administrable justice system. This is a laudable objective,
however Davis departs too far from the Miranda Court's concerns, to the
point of ignoring the coercive pressures of an interrogation which led to
Miranda and Edwards."'
Gregory J. Griffith
1 See supra notes 2, 54-55, 61-83 and accompanying text.
is: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
157 People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (1. 1980); see supra note 102 and
accompanying text.
Io "[O]fficers must be allowed to exercise their judgment in determining whether a
suspect has requested counsel." Krueger, 412 N.E.2d at 540.
"' See supra notes 17-52 and accompanying text.
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